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Like politics and religion, water is an emotionally charged 
topic about which reasonable people vehemently disagree. 
Some of those disagreements arise from three common 
misconceptions about groundwater:  
1) A drop in artesian pressure implies an equally large 
drop in an aquifer’s storage. 
2) Sustainability requires that pumping equal recharge. 
3) Dewatering an aquifer impoverishes future generations. 
Together these three miscon-
ceptions lead adherents to 
conclude that since the loss 
in artesian pressure has been 
quite marked in many of Tex-
as’ key aquifers, these aqui-
fers are facing imminent de-
pletion and the only reasona-
ble policy prescriptions are 
to limit pumping to recharge 
and then let regulators de-
cide who gets to pump. Be-
fore embracing these policy 
prescriptions, let’s consider 
WHAT’S THE TAKEAWAY? 
 
Regulations need to be based 
on loss in aquifer storage, not 
artesian pressure. 
  
Dewatering aquifers is okay if 
limited and water markets are 
available to signal scarcity. 
  
Viable water markets require 
a correlative rights system and 
ending discrimination among 
users and uses. 
2 the empirical basis for these three misconcep-
tions. 
MISCONCEPTION 1: Does the loss in ar-
tesian pressure lead to an equally large 
loss in aquifer storage?  
Suppose as in Central Texas, the Trinity Aqui-
fer lays 1,000 feet below the surface. While 
originally, the well naturally flowed to the 
surface without a pump, now there has been a 
50% loss in artesian pressure, requiring 
pumps to be set at 500 feet. Does a 50% loss 
in artesian pressure imply a 50% loss in aqui-
fer storage? No, the relationship between the 
two is highly non-linear.1 A 50% loss in arte-
sian pressure may entail only a loss of a few 
percent of storage (as in Figure 1). However, 
even after all artesian pressure is lost, 
pumpers can still continue to dewater the aq-
uifer, albeit at increased costs.  
MISCONCEPTION 2: Does sustainability 
require that pumping equal recharge?  
On the face of it, by pumping only the re-
charge going into the aquifer, storage can be 
maintained indefinitely, treating equally all 
future generations. To many, this is the only 
morally responsible policy prescription.  
Before accepting this prescription, consider 
the following thought experiment: Imagine a 
huge aquifer with no recharge. If pumping 
were limited to recharge, there would be zero 
pumping both now and forever. Zero pumping 
would confer no benefits to any generation!  
Shouldn’t dewatering an aquifer depend on 
the size of the aquifer’s storage relative to 
the rate of recharge? For example, in the 
Trinity Aquifer, storage is about 14,800 
times annual recharge. Pumping could be 
twice recharge for 3,700 years before de-
pleting even half of storage. For other key 
Texas aquifers, like the Carizzo-Wilcox and 
Gulf Coast, storage is 520 and 4,000 times 
recharge, respectively.2 But eventually, 
won’t complete dewatering leave the aquifer 
dry?  What happens then?  
MISCONCEPTION 3: Will dewatering 
an aquifer really condemn future gen-
erations to poverty?  
Curiously, if these big three aquifers had no 
recharge, they would be treated like any oth-
er non-renewable resource. Society shows no 
qualms about depleting oil and gas fields, 
phosphate mines, uranium mines, etc. To 
date, cost and resource saving technological 
change have in most instances offset the de-
pletion effect, so that prices have either fall-
en in real terms or risen moderately.3  
There are good reasons why these same fac-
tors would apply to water. There are two 
basic reasons—the Law of Demand and the 
Law of Supply. In Figure 2, line D shows the 
familiar demand curve from Econ 101. The 
Law of Demand states that ceteris paribus 
(i.e., holding constant things like population 
and per-capita income) as the price rises 
consumers will conserve by using less. Lots 
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Figure 1: Artesian Pressure vs. Loss in Storage 
of economic research shows that this curve 
slopes downward to the right and is not ver-
tical. A recent survey of the literature sug-
gests that the average elasticity estimates is 
-0.48 — implying that a doubling of the price 
of water would lead to a 48% reduction in 
usage.4 Examples of conservation in re-
sponse to rising prices include installing 
more efficient irrigation pivots, planting less 
water-intensive crops, and installing a host 
of conservation devices by homeowners and 
industrial users.  
The Law of Supply is yet another powerful 
force to expand supplies. The long run ver-
sion of the Law of Supply tells us that rising 
prices will stimulate investment in relatively 
underutilized aquifers and encourage desali-
nation technology to access Texas’ enor-
mous brackish water supplies.  
Putting the two laws together, Figure 2 
shows that at today’s artificially low water 
prices, Ptoday, (due to the current rationing 
system) it appears there is a water crisis be-
cause the quantity of water demanded far 
exceeds available supplies. But if the market 
is allowed to function properly, prices will 
rise to P* forcing consumers to conserve and 
suppliers to develop new supplies.  
In sum, the same market forces of supply 
and demand apply to water as they do for 
non-renewable resources in general. There 
is little evidence that the current generation 
has been victimized by previous genera-
tions’ profligate use of these resources. 
There is one important feature of markets—
they will provide price signals of impending 
shortage giving regulators and the market 
time to make necessary adjustments. 
NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR A 
PROPERLY FUNCTIONING MARKET  
If markets are to provide this valuable sig-
naling device, groundwater must be actively 
traded.  This means that water must move 
both geographically (so that water from one 
aquifer can be pumped to customers in an-
other) and functionally (so that water can be 
switched to alternative, higher-valued uses). 
The Edwards Aquifer boasts a viable water 
market. But, the big three aquifers serving 
the most populous parts of the state—the 
Trinity, Carizzo-Wilcox, and Gulf Coast Aqui-
fers—lack  active water markets.   
Regulatory hurdles by local groundwater 
conservation districts (GCDs) prevent 
groundwater from moving to higher-valued 
uses. Even though the Courts have identified 
a number of beneficial uses of water, GCDs 
can make it difficult to change the use of 
groundwater,5 and to export outside a GCD. 
In 2016, of 97 GCDs surveyed, only 6 export-
ed more than 1% of quantity pumped.6 Addi-
tionally, Desired Future Conditions (DFCs) 
based on loss of artesian pressure instead of 
loss in storage artificially limits overall 
pumping. New permits may be denied while 
historical pumpers with large, grandfa-
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Figure 2: Laws of Supply and Demand 
thered pumping rights continue to pump un-
hindered.7 For areas outside of a GCD, which 
fall under the Rule of Capture, there is the op-
posite problem—a built in incentive to over-
pump and under-price groundwater.8  
The necessary changes to enable a groundwa-
ter market in the Trinity, Carizzo-Wilcox, and 
Gulf Coast Aquifers would require the follow-
ing three conditions: 
1) Set DFCs based on loss of storage and not 
on artesian pressure. 
2) Prohibit GCD policies that have the effect 
of discriminating among uses and users.  
3) Assure equal access by instituting some 
type of Correlative Rights System both 
within GCDs and non-GCD areas, whereby 
all pumpers would share and share alike. I 
strongly prefer the groundwater bank sys-
tem vis-a -vis other correlative rights sys-
tems which I outlined in the Texas Water 
Journal.9 With bank accounts, landowners 
would have incentives to leave groundwa-
ter in the ground. 
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on The Takeaway, 
please visit  
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